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INTRODUCTION

As unbelievable as it may sound, philosophically-minded constitutional law professors sometimes have to strain to connect their own
abstract interests with those of their students. That being the case,
with its decision in R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine (2003) ("MalmoLevine"),' the Supreme Court of Canada gave these professors a wonderful Christmas present.2 The Malmo-Levine decision provides a
"real world" context for otherwise esoteric questions about the relationship between John Stuart Mill's harm principle 3-that nineteenth
century nugget of liberal theory-and the legitimacy of government
1. Malmo-Levine v. The Queen, [20031 3 S.C.R. 571.
2. The decision was released on December 23, 2003. Id.
3. Justices Gonthier and Binnie quoted J.S. Mill in Malmo-Levine:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively,
in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant
.... The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to
society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns
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activity. While the mere mention of Mill's famous maxim by the
Court would have been rich enough for many a chalk-dusted academic, the Supreme Court in Malmo-Levine outdid itself by going on
to consider whether the harm principle is the basis for (in the majority
judgment's
own words) a "free-standing constitutional right to smoke
'pot." 4 This consideration should be enough to arouse even the students snoozing at the back of the class.
In the result, the majority rejected Malmo-Levine and Caine's arguments, many of which were based upon Section 7 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("Charter"). 5 Section 7 of the Charter guarantees that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." Although the
offences of simple possession of a narcotic and possession for the purposes of trafficking 6 infringe the right to liberty under Section 7,7
Malmo-Levine and Caine failed to satisfy the Court that this infringement was inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice because, among other reasons, the Court held that the harm principle
was not part of that concept.
As important as the defeat of a particular kind of lifestyle libertarianism in the Malmo-Levine decision may be, the concern of this Article lies elsewhere. In the process of considering the harm principle's
candidacy for constitutional status, the majority decision in MalmoLevine consolidated (almost) twenty years of its jurisprudence concerning the nature of the principles of fundamental justice. In MalmoLevine, the majority reframed a test for any newly offered up principles that deserve this special constitutional status. "Newly offered up"
rather than just plain "new" is a significant distinction here because in
Malmo-Levine the majority reaffirmed its position that, in effect, the
principles of fundamental justice cannot be new to our legal system.
Whatever these enigmatic standards are-and no definitive catalogue
himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own
body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
Id. at 631 (quoting J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 8-9 (R.B. McCallum ed., 1946) (1859)) (emphasis omitted).
4. Id. at 624.
5. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act,
1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
6. Malmo-Levine and Caine were charged under the Narcotics Control Act,
R.S.C., ch. N-1 (1985). Malmo-Levine, 3 S.C.R. at 595. This statute was repealed in
1996 by the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C., ch.
N-1 (1985), repealed by Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, 1996 S.C., ch. 19, § 94
(Can.). The CDSA includes the offences of simple possession of a narcotic and possession for the purposes of trafficking. Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, 1996
S.C. 1996, ch. 19, §§ 4-5 (Can.).
7. Insofar as the potential of imprisonment upon conviction is part of the definition of a criminal offence, all criminal offences infringe the liberty interest under Section 7 of the Charter. In re Constitutional Question Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 49 44
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exists-from its earliest decision on point,8 the Supreme Court has
consistently indicated that "the principles of fundamental justice are
to be found [among] the basic tenets of our legal system."9 Suffice it
to say that our legal system, based as it is upon the common law, has
been around for a long time, and presumably, its "basic tenets" must
be some of its oldest parts.
In Malmo-Levine, the majority decision demonstrates how reverence for the past can influence judicial analysis in such a way as to
significantly limit the ability of a constitutionally entrenched bill of
rights to provide a constructively critical perspective on the regular
laws of a legal system. In Malmo-Levine, one important reason that
the majority gave for rejecting the constitutional status of the harm
principle is that we have always had, and continue to have, laws that
criminalize "harmless" behaviour. From a strong human rights perspective, the existence of laws that are contrary to fundamental principles merely begs the question as to how much of the legal system may
be "invalid" in an important sense. However, from the perspective of
the kind of legal ancestor worship which the Supreme Court is prepared to engage in its fundamental justice analysis, long-standing legal
rules themselves contain messages about what "must" be the underlying constitutional principles that support them, and, conversely, the
principles that underlie our legal system cannot include standards that
challenge long-standing legal rules. In this way, the majority in
Malmo-Levine "induced," or inferred, that the harm principle obviously was not part of the concept of fundamental justice in Canada.
In this Article, I argue that the Supreme Court of Canada's location
of the principles of fundamental justice among the basic tenets of our
legal system-and nowhere else-aligns the Court with particular aspects of the eighteenth century jurist William Blackstone's thoughts.
The jurisprudential part of Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of
England (1765)10 is premised upon a faith in the existence of fundamental principles that must be assumed to underlie the common law.
As reflections of these principles, common law rules deserve deference, even though the principles themselves are not clear. I argue
that, whatever else may be said in favour of Blackstone's ideas about
the common law, this perspective provides an inappropriate tool for
the analysis of the provisions of the Charter in general, and fundamental justice in Section 7 in particular. I argue that Blackstonian
analysis is an inductive, conservative technique that is in direct tension
with the deductive, potentially progressive version of strong modern
human rights theory, which explains the need for constitutionally entrenched bills of rights such as the Charter.
8. Id. at 486.
9. Id. at 503.
10. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

1-4
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Blackstone's perspective on the common law has served the cause
of freedom honourably and in a manner that complements some important human rights struggles. Most famously, Blackstone's determination that "a slave or a negro, the moment he lands in England, falls
under the protection of the laws, and so far becomes a freeman" 11
supported the far-reaching decision by Blackstone's friend and mentor, Lord Mansfield, in Somerset v. Stewart (1772).12 Mansfield's decision in Somerset heralded the end of the practice of slavery in England
and the colonies. The common law's ability to assist the emancipation
movement, however, is indicative of a happy convergence between
some aspects of the two sets of standards, the basic common law tenets of our legal system and modern human rights principles. These
sets of standards do not, however, mirror each other, and the extent to
which they can diverge was illustrated by the Supreme Court of Canada in the first case in which it applied the Malmo-Levine framework
for analyzing the principles of fundamental justice. CanadianFoundation for Youth, Children and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General)
(2004) ("Foundation")13 involved a constitutional challenge of the corporal punishment defence. In the Foundation decision, a majority of
the Supreme Court denied that the "best interests of the child" principle, an important human rights standard, is a principle of fundamental
justice under Section 7 of the Charter. A significant part of the rationale for rejecting the best interests of the child principle was the dismal truism that our laws have always allowed the best interests of the
children to be compromised.
In Malmo-Levine, the Supreme Court of Canada entered upon its
second generation of attempts to define fundamental justice in Section
7 of the Charter with a renewed commitment to keeping this concept
rooted in our legal past. The Supreme Court's determination in this
regard may promise the comforts of familiarity. This parochialism
may also reflect a commendable attempt on the part of the Court to
place meaningful and clearly "legal" limits on the scope of its power
to review government activity under the Constitution. However, for
better or for worse, the Charter in general, and Section 7 in particular,
launched Canada into an unfamiliar era of human rights-respecting
constitutionalism. This new era requires an attitude of constructive
suspicion of our legal traditions and a cosmopolitan openness to
human rights principles that "belong" in a rights-respecting legal system, even though the legal system that we have has never recognized
these principles. We should celebrate whatever convergences may exist between common law principles and modern human rights standards, while avoiding the tendency to assume, as Blackstone would
11. 1 id. at *127.
12. Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 509 (K.B.).
13. Canadian Found. for Children, Youth & the Law v. Att'y Gen. in Right of
Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76.
A,
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have it, that "absolute rights ... are coeval with" and, therefore, inseparable from "our form of government" 4 and the legal system that
defines it.
In the next part of this Article, I discuss William Blackstone's perspective on the existence of principles that underlie the common law,
and I then, in Part III, place Blackstone's perspective on absolute
rights and civil liberties into the context of bill of rights theory. The
focus of the Article then shifts to a consideration of the significance of
common law theorizing for Canada's constitutional situation. As
something of a prelude to this consideration, Part IV considers a much
overlooked part of Canada's written Constitution, Section 7 of the
Statute of Westminster.' 5 This Section of the Constitution is probably
aimed at preventing Canadian judges from relying upon the common
law to expand their jurisdiction to review government activity based
upon common law principles. The lack of attention to-or perhaps
general knowledge of-Section 7 of the Statute of Westminster represents an important absence in the context of the interest that our
courts have shown in common law constitutional standards over the
last several years.
In Parts V and VI of this Article, I discuss the fact that, notwithstanding the formal restrictions on this activity, and quite apart from
adjudication under the Charter, the last twenty years have witnessed a
remarkable degree of interest by Canadian courts in the common law
as a source of judicially enforceable principles, The authority that the
Supreme Court has identified for the expansion of its jurisdiction is
the "grand entrance hall" to the Constitution, which is the preamble
to the Constitution Act, 1867, and, in particular, its reference to Cathat is similar in principle to that
nada's desire to have a constitution
16
of the United Kingdom.
In contrast to the "grand entrance hall" to the Constitution, in Parts
VII and VIII of this Article, I discuss the situation, structure, and significance of Section 7 of the Charter, and I analyze the way in which it
was turned into a "side door" for common law principles to enter the
written Constitution. Part IX analyzes the Malmo-Levine decision
and emphasizes the Blackstonian aspects of the majority's reasoning.
Part X analyzes the way in which this spirit of deference to long-standing legal practices had an unfortunate influence upon the Supreme
Court of Canada's reasoning in Foundation.

14. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *127.
15. Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, c. 4, § 7 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C.,
No. 27 (Appendix H 1985).
16. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, pmbl. (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C.,
No. 5 (Appendix 1985).
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BLACKSTONE AND THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE
COMMON LAW

[I]n our law, the goodness of a custom depends upon it's having
been used time out of mind; or, in the solemnity of our legal phrase,
time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. This
it is that gives it it's weight and authority[.]1 7
Beginning his lectures at Oxford in 1753, and appointed to the
newly created Vinerian Chair in 1758, William Blackstone was the
first professor of English common law in the world. Blackstone published his lectures in the four-volume Commentaries on the Laws of
England between 1765 and 1769. To the satisfaction of many, 18 Blackstone had realized "that great dream ...

a clear statement of the En-

glish Common Law."1 9 Perhaps more significantly, Blackstone
provided assurance that the common law actually existed at all as a
cohesive, observable entity.2 ° The Commentaries, first published
seven years before Lord Mansfield's decision in Somerset, were held
in high enough estimation by his Lordship that, on being asked to recommend books for law students, Mansfield reportedly replied:
Till of late I could never, with any satisfaction to myself, answer that
question; but, since the publication of Mr. Blackstone's Commentaries I can never be at a loss. There your son will find analytical
reasoning diffused in a pleasing and perspicuous style. There he
may imbibe imperceptibly the first principles on which our excellent
laws are founded ..... 2

Blackstone's effort to consolidate the common law in the eighteenth
century falls within a tradition of what Gerald Postema calls "classical
common law theory," which began in the late feudal and early modern
period.2 2 Common law theory responded to the developing "ideology
of political absolutism": the increasing tendency of monarchs to rule
"guided by nothing but their own assessments of the demands of justice, expediency, and the common good., 23 Common law theory rejects the ability of rulers to be the source of law, asserting instead that
17. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *67.
18. The Commentaries were a publishing success in Britain and the colonies. The
Commentaries sold 1,000 copies in the American colonies before the first American
publication. Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5
(1996).
19. LEWIS C. WARDEN, THE LIFE OF BLACKSTONE 258 (1938).
20. A.W.B. Simpson points to the historic lack of an adequate theory to answer
the question as to "whether the common law can be said to exist at all-and this has
been seriously doubted-and if so in what sense." A.W.B. Simpson, The Common
Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 77, 78 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 2d ed. 1973).
21. WARDEN, supra note 19, at 265. In fact, Lord Mansfield read for corrections
some of the proofs of the Commentaries. See id. at 258.
22. GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 3 (1986).
23. Id. at 4.
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legal realmonarchs, Parliament, and judges merely express a deeper
'
ity that is "historically evidenced [by] national custom. 24
Similarly, Norman Cantor emphasizes how Blackstone's Commentaries reflect the "Norman myth," which was propagated in the wake
of the English Civil War. The Norman myth explained and justified
regicide and, ultimately, the Glorious Revolution as a reassertion of
ancient Anglo-Saxon freedom. 25 Although subverted during the Norman occupation, the Norman myth holds that this freedom survived in
the common law. 26 The Norman myth is also connected with the current of seventeenth century thought which emphasized the existence
and resiliency of the "ancient constitution" of England: "[t]he dominant myth of seventeenth-century constitutionalism ... that the English constitution and laws were immemorial, antedating the authority
of kings[.]

' 27

In the introduction to his Commentaries, Blackstone identifies the
common law as one of the two parts of the "municipal" or domestic
law of England.28 The common law or unwritten law ("lex non
scripta") is distinguished from statute law ("lex scripta").29 The common law is contained in written judicial decisions, but Blackstone emphasizes that these rules are still "unwritten" in the important sense
that "their original institution and authority are not set down in writing, as acts of parliament are, but they receive their binding power,
and the force of laws, by long and immemorial usage .... "
Early in his introduction, Blackstone establishes his theme of the
superiority of lex non scripta as a warehouse of inscrutable principles
that legislators interfere with at their peril: "[A]ll the perplexed questions . . . (which have sometimes disgraced the English, as well as

other courts of justice) owe their original not to the common law it24. Id.
25. This is captured in John Locke's introduction to The Second Treatise of Government, which is intended to "establish the throne of our great restorer, our present
King William-to make good his title in the consent of the people ...and to justify to
the world the people of England, whose love of their just and natural rights, with their
resolution to preserve them, saved the nation when it was on the very brink of slavery
and ruin." JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 3 (Thomas P.
Peardon ed., Bobbs-Merril Educ. Publ'g 1952) (1690).
26. See NORMAN F. CANTOR, IMAGINING THE LAW: COMMON LAW AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 342 (1997); 1 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 10, at *17 ("That ancient collection of unwritten maxims and customs, which is
called the common law . . . had subsisted immemorially in this kingdom[ ]; and,
though somewhat altered and impaired by the violence of the times, had in great
measure weathered the rude shock of the Norman conquest.").
27. Robert Willman, Blackstone and the 'Theoretical Perfection' of English Law in
the Reign of Charles II, 26 HIST. J. 39, 42 (1983).
28. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *63. "[T]hough strictly ["municipal law"]
... denotes the particular customs of one single municipium or free town, yet it may
with sufficient propriety be applied to any one state or nation, which is governed by
the same laws and customs." 1 id. at *44.
29. 1 id. at *63.
30. 1 id. at *64.
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self, but to innovations that have been made in it by acts of parliament[.] '' 3 1 In (a somewhat circular) response to the "very natural, and
very material question" as to how these rules and maxims are to be
known and their validity established, Blackstone recommends our reliance on the "living oracles"-judges-"who are bound by an oath to
decide according to the law of the land."3 2
For their part, the "living oracles" are obliged to "abide by former
precedents, where the same points come again in litigation" even
when these rules are contrary to the judges' "private sentiments." An
exception to the dispassionate application of precedent by judges is
when the rules are "contrary to reason." However, in a manner that
echoes his warning to legislators, Blackstone indicates that the benefit
of the doubt, in relation to the rationality of the common law, should
go to the ancient rules themselves:
[Tihe law is the perfection of reason .. . it always intends to conform thereto ... what is not reason is not law. Not that the particular reason of every rule in the law can at this time be always
precisely assigned; but it is sufficient that there be nothing in the
rule flatly contradictory to reason, and then the law will presume it
to be well founded .... [T]hough their reason be not obvious at first
as not to suppose
view, yet we owe such a deference to former times,
33
that they acted wholly without consideration.

One dimension of the common law's underlying rational structure
that may be difficult to discern is the extent to which it serves the ends
of liberty. Blackstone provides some assistance with his observations
in relation to the most basic nature of law and the existence of fundamental rights. Fundamental rights fall into two categories: absolute
and relative. Absolute rights belong to "men . . . as individuals or
single persons. ' 34 Relative rights belong to people as members of
society.
Absolute rights are "natural libert[ies]," which consist of "a power
of acting as one [sees] fit, without any restraint or control ... one of
the gifts of God to man at his creation[.],, 35 Blackstone contends,
however, that every person who enters into society gives up a part of
31. 1 id. at *10.
32. 1 id. at *69.
33. 1 id. at *70 (emphasis added). On this point, Daniel Boorstin observes that
Blackstone held since law was worth studying, his Enlightenment-era understanding
was that it had to be reducible to rational principles. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW

20 (1941), Blackstone went further, however, to en-

gage "a very different assumption, that because the laws of England ought to be
studied, these laws themselves contained such principles." Id. Later Boorstin states,
"Blackstone presupposed that anything which was not intelligible according to reason
could not be law. But he actually went much further, and by a convenient inversion
of logic said, in effect, that what was customarily thought of as law must by definition
have an intelligible reason." Id. at 23.
34. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *123.
35. 1 id. at *125.
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this "savage liberty" in exchange for "the advantages of mutual commerce" that are received by "conform[ing] to those laws, which the
community has thought proper to establish." In a passage that reflects
Hobbes' analysis, Blackstone argues "no man... would wish to retain
the absolute and uncontrolled power of doing whatever he pleases:
the consequence of which is, that every other man would also have the
same power; and then there would be no security to individuals in any
...enjoyment[ ] of life."3 6
Blackstone introduces us to the concept of "civil liberty," which is
"no other than natural liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no
farther) as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the
public."3 7 Ultimately, Blackstone asserts that this "residuum of natural liberty ... [can] be reduced to three princip[les] or primary articles[:] the right of personal security, of liberty, and of property."3 8
Blackstone's contention that the "principal view of human laws is,
or ought . . .to be," to protect civil liberties39 is the basis only for
criticism of foreign legal systems, enjoining us to have faith in the wisdom of English law; while "the rights of all mankind ... in most other
countries [are] now more or less debased and destroyed, they at present may be said to remain, in a peculiar and emphatic[ ] manner, the
rights of the people of England."4 In Blackstone's estimation, "[t]he
idea and practice of ...civil liberty falls little short of perfection [in
the United Kingdom] .... [T]he legislature[s], and of course the laws
of England, [are] peculiarly adapted to the preservation of this inestimable blessing even in the meanest subject."4 1 Blackstone is then led
to the statement that reflects Lord Mansfield's holding in Somerset v.
Stewart:
And this spirit of liberty is so deeply implanted in our constitution,
and rooted even in our very soil, that a slave or a negro, the moment he lands in England, falls under the protection of the laws, and
so far becomes a freeman ....The absolute rights of every Englishman . . .as they are founded on nature and reason, so they are
coeval with our form of government.42
III.

COMMON LAW LIBERTIES AND BILL OF RIGHTS THEORY

Blackstone's theory of rights is in keeping with his general veneration of the common law as the perfection of reason. We are encouraged to accept that the law has developed to accommodate and
protect fundamental rights and liberties. An alternative understand36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 1 id. at *129.

39. 1 id. at *124.
40. 1 id. at

*129.

41. 1 id. at *126-27 (emphasis added).
42. 1 id.at *127.
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ing of fundamental rights and liberties, however, encourages us to be
much more suspicious about the moral content of positive law,
whether it be common law rules or statutes. In fact, Blackstone's
work sits on the cusp of an important sea change in this regard.
Daniel Boorstin points out the "remarkable irony" that by invoking
the concept of liberty as a reason to be satisfied with long-standing
laws and social traditions, "Blackstone used the very notion which,
before the end of the eighteenth century, Paine and Jefferson and
Robespierre were to use to make the name of liberty odious to conservative ears." The latter revolutionary understanding of rights is responsible for the phenomenon of bills of rights being entrenched in
the written constitutions of the United States, France, and, ultimately,
Canada.
The revolutionary constitutions of the United States and France represent the beginning of new legal orders. The bills of rights that are
entrenched in these constitutions reflect a strong "top down" natural
law orientation.4 3 A perpetually critical perspective is provided by the
bills of rights, which frame objective moral standards that are prior to
ordinary law and with which the ordinary law in its development must
conform. The process of analysis that this form of natural law theory
recommends is Cartesian or rationalist in nature, descending deductively from a point of certainty. The first step is to engage in the abstract process of defining the nature and scope of the right or liberty,
after which legal rules that are consistent with that guarantee can be
deduced. Alternatively, existing ordinary laws can be tested against
the scope of the guarantee.
Blackstone discusses the historic British experience with charters
and bills of rights. In response to episodes of executive tyranny and
anarchy, he states that, "the vigour of our free constitution ... delivered the nation from these embarrassments," and civil liberties "have
been from time to time asserted in parliament, as often as they were
thought to be in danger."4 4 Blackstone provides eight examples of
these, including the Bill of Rights of 1688. In Blackstone's analysis,
these examples demonstrate Parliament reasserting standards of liberty that already existed in the common law, but which had been
tested by the executive. In the spirit of the "Norman myth" and "ancient constitution" theories, the "several statutes" that Blackstone discusses did not establish standards for a new legal era against which all
laws, past and present, were to be measured. On the contrary, the Bill
of Rights, for example, is a monument to the ancient legal order and
long-standing legal rules.
In contrast to the deductive, "top down" natural law theory that
characterizes the application of constitutionally entrenched bills of
43. See Alschuler, supra note 18, at 22.
44. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *129.
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rights inspired by the revolutionary tradition, Blackstone's perspective
recommends a "bottom up" empirical, inductive process. For Blackstone, English law has already evolved in such a way as to restrain
natural, absolute liberty only so far "(and no farther) as is necessary
and expedient for the general advantage of the public."4 5 The question, therefore, is not what the scope of these liberties are or should be
in the abstract, but, rather, what is the scope of these guarantees given
the laws that are in existence.4 6 Insofar as the precise abstract nature
of these liberties is concerned, the price of the empirical method that
Blackstone employed is uncertainty: "Because [the subject of study]
was 'case law,' it could never achieve certainty; yet at its best, as Lord
Mansfield put it, 'the common law works itself pure.' It was a science,
albeit a science of probabilities."4 7
Unlike revolutionary constitutions with entrenched bills of rights,
Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms is grafted on to a constitution that, in the opening words of one of its formative documents,
remains "similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom[.]" 4 8
However, notwithstanding this formal connection to the body of ancient unwritten law that constitutes the "common law constitution,"4 9
the Charter represents a commitment to bring to this legal order, as it
applies in the Canadian context, the rigours of the same kind of rationalist or "critical" rights analysis that applies to revolutionary constitutions with entrenched bills of rights.
As a matter of logic, it would make little sense for the Charter's
guarantees to be defined by, and restricted to, the legal order that
Canada already has, which includes its common law heritage. No
Charter guarantee of freedom of religion is needed, for example, if the
scope of that freedom is merely relative to the way in which ordinary
laws-common law or statutory-happen to limit it or not. A Charter
guarantee only makes sense if, in fact, we believe that it compels the
government to respect a pre-legal or extra-legal scope of religious liberty. For better or for worse, this critical approach to rights enforcement and analysis requires judges to engage in a degree of extra-legal
moral inquiry, at least to the extent that they must be open to argu45. 1 id. at *125.
46. In relation to Blackstone's scientific aspirations, Boorstin argues that he was
challenged to "us[e] scientific notions for ...fruitful inquiry, without allowing them to
call into question fundamental conservative beliefs." BOORSTIN, supra note 33, at 18.
Harold Berman and Charles Reid place Blackstone at the vanguard of a more general
change in legal method, which used common law rules and precedents as phenomena
to be examined objectively in an attempt to discern underlying principles. Harold J.
Berman & Charles J. Reid Jr., The Transformation of English Legal Science: From
Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 437, 492 (1996).
47. Berman & Reid, supra note 46, at 500.
48. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, pmbl. (U.K.), as reprintedin R.S.C.,
No. 5 (Appendix 1985).
49. See Mark D. Walters, The Common Law Constitution in Canada: Return of
Lex Non Scripta as Fundamental Law, 51 U. TORONTO L.J. 91 (2001).
353
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ments that new and long-standing common law and statutory rules
inadequately respect the constitution's guarantees.
Canadian history also demonstrates that statutory human rights regimes and the Charter are responses to the "bankruptcy" of the common law5" in relation to its ability to protect civil liberties in Canada in
many important respects.51 The Canadian Charter manifests the intention to bring the rationalist, critical tradition of rights protection
into our legal order because the historic alternative was not good
enough. The fact that parts of the common law may be consistent
with contemporary human rights and anti-discrimination standards
provides no assurance that the common law "naturally" protects
these values or, conversely, that whatever set of values that it does
protect are the only ones that we should care about.
IV.

FORMAL RESTRICTIONS ON COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONAL
ADJUDICATION IN CANADA

Until recently, and with rare exceptions, dominant themes of British

constitutional theory prevented the common law constitution from being seriously considered as a source of unwritten principles that can
restrict Canada's federal and provincial governments. This rejection
of the authority of unwritten principles was supported by provisions of
imperial statutes that denied the ability of the "Laws of England" to
invalidate Canadian statutes. These statutory provisions continue to
be part of Canada's written Constitution.
A.V. Dicey's constitutional theory was transcendent at the Confederation period. According to Dicey, parliamentary supremacy was the
first feature that, "since the Norman Conquest[,] characterised the political institutions of England."52 Although unwritten common law
principles and rules apply in the absence of legislation, the strongest
version of parliamentary sovereignty does not accept that any such
unwritten standards can restrain legislative power.
The Colonial Laws Validity Act5 3 and, as an on-going matter, the
Statute of Westminster 54 also operated against the applicability of
common law principles in the Canadian constitutional context. In response to the common law activism of one Australian judge in particu50. See Ken Norman, Problems in Human Rights Legislation and Administration,
inEQUALITY AND JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY 391 (Sheilah L. Martin & Kathleen E. Mahoney eds., 1987).
51. See CONSTANCE BACKHOUSE, COLOUR-CODED: A LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN CANADA, 1900-1950 (1999); THOMAS R. BERGER, FRAGILE FREEDOMS:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISSENT IN CANADA (1981); WALTER TARNAPOLSKY, DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW IN CANADA (1982).
52. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 183 (10th ed. 1961).
53. Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63 (U.K.).
54. Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, c. 4, § 7 (U.K.), as reprintedin R.S.C.,
No. 27 (Appendix 11 1985).
1
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lar,5 the Colonial Laws Validity Act confirmed that only British
statutory law had paramountcy over colonial laws. Colonial laws
could not be declared inoperative or void on the basis of common law
principles ("the law of England") alone.5 6 The Act continued in force
in Canada after the passage of the British North America Act (later
renamed the Constitution Act, 1867) 57 until it was repealed in its application to Canada and other Dominions58 by the Statue of
Westminster.
The Statute of Westminster, which is part of Canada's Constitution,6 ° provides, inter alia, that United Kingdom statutes only apply to
Canada in situations where a Canadian declaration expressly requests
and consents to such application. Furthermore, with the express exception of the British North America Act itself, the Statute of Westminster gave Canada the ability to amend or repeal imperial statutes
that form part of Canada's laws. 6 1 Of most significance to this discussion is the fact that Subsection 2(2) of the Statute of Westminster expressly maintains the inability of the Law of England to render void or
inoperative laws made "by the Parliament of a Dominion." Section 7
55. The Colonial Laws Validity Act was passed by the Imperial Parliament in 1865
in response to the judicial experimentation of South Australian Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Boothby. Walters, supra note 49, at 122. Justice Boothby had declared
that a number of statutes passed by Australian governments were void for their repugnance to unwritten principles of the British common law constitution. Id. at
122-23. These common law principles included the right to a trial by jury in matters
relating to the ownership of land. See id. at 123.
56. Section 3 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act reads: "No colonial law shall be or
be deemed to have been void or inoperative on the ground of repugnancy to the law
of England, unless the same shall be repugnant to the provisions of some such Act of
Parliament, order, or regulation as aforesaid." Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, § 3.
57. There is some argument that the reference in the Constitution Act, 1867 to
Canada's desire to have a constitution that is similar in principle to that to the United
Kingdom impliedly amended the Colonial Laws Validity Act, insofar as it applied to
Canada. See Walters, supra note 49, at 129-30.
58. The other Dominions include Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South
Africa, the Irish Free State, and Newfoundland. Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22
Geo. 5, c. 4, § 7 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 27 (Appendix II 1985).
59. Id. § 2(1).
60. Section 52(2)(a) of the Constitution Act, 1982 defines the Constitution of Canada to include the CanadaAct, 1982, which includes the Constitution Act, 1982, and
in Subsection (b) "the Acts and orders referred to in the schedule[.]" Part VII of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11,
§ 52(2)(a)-(b) (U.K.). The Statute of Westminster is item 17 in that schedule. Schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11,
item 17 (U.K.).
61. This exception was included at the request of the Canadian delegates to the
imperial conference of 1930 which adopted the recommendation that resulted in the
passage of the Statute of Westminster. The delegates wanted to avoid giving to the
federal or provincial governments the power to alter the British North America Act,
including most importantly its division of powers sections, by ordinary statute. The
power to amend this statute remained with the United Kingdom Parliament until
amending formulas were entrenched in the Constitution Act, 1982. See PETER HOGG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA § 3.5 (loose-leaf ed. 1997).
"1
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of the Statute makes the provisions of Section 2 apply to the provincial legislatures as well.62
Accordingly, Diceyan theory and, more significantly, provisions of
the written Constitution of Canada stand in strong opposition to the
incorporation of common law constitutional principles in such a way
as to restrict the powers of the federal or provincial governments. Interestingly, these impediments do not seem to have dampened the Supreme Court's enthusiasm for this source of expanded powers of
judicial review.
The next part of this Article will briefly review the Supreme Court's
interest in a form of common law constitutionalism that it claims jurisdiction to engage in through the preamble to the Constitutional Act,
1867. I will then discuss how the Court turned the concept of fundamental justice in Section 7 of the Charter into a vehicle for a similar,
although more limited, form of engagement with common law standards. If the restrictions set forth in Section 7 of the Statute of Westminster were to be taken seriously in the Charter context, any
relationship between common law standards and the "principles of
fundamental justice" would be incidental. The courts would be compelled to look elsewhere than the ancient "laws of England"-which
must be strongly represented among the "basic tenets of our legal system"-for the principles of fundamental justice that allow governments to restrict the rights to life, liberty, and security of the person.
Human rights theory, with its emphasis on the respect for the dignity
of every individual as a human being of equal worth, would be the
obvious alternative. 63 If the common law reflects some of these individual rights principles, then so much the better, but interest in a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights for Canada was fuelled, in part,
by the fact that in many respects the common law has not protected
human rights.
V.

THE GRAND ENTRANCE HALL TO THE CASTLE OF
THE CONSTITUTION

Canada's Constitution gets off to an anomalous start. The preamble
to what is essentially our founding document, the Constitution Act,
1867, indicates that Canada will have a constitution that is "similar in
principle to that of the United Kingdom." The United Kingdom's
constitution is largely unwritten. In a single stroke, therefore, the potential for definitiveness, which is an attribute of a constitution that is
primarily written, is undermined by the fact that it simultaneously em62. Section 7(2) of the Statute of Westminster reads: "The provisions of section
two of this Act shall extend to laws made by any of the Provinces of Canada and to
the powers of the legislatures of such Provinces." Statute of Westminster, 1931,
§ 7(2).
63. See Mark Carter, FundamentalJustice in Section 7 of the Charter: A Human
Rights Interpretation,52 U.N.B.L.J. 243 (2003).
1

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol13/iss2/4
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V13.I2.3

14

Carter: “Blackstoned” Again: Common Law Liberties, the Canadian Constitut

2007]

BLACKSTONED AGAIN

braces-without delineating-unwritten principles of the British common law constitution. In a trend that reached something of a zenith in
the Reference Re. Secession of Quebec (1998),64 the Supreme Court
has demonstrated strong interest in the way that the preamble to the
Constitution Act, 1867 embraces the common law constitution and the
potential for these unwritten principles to expand the scope of judicial
review. This phenomenon has proceeded, moreover, without reference to the provisions of the Statute of Westminster, which seem to

oppose it.
Indicative of this new fascination with unwritten constitutional principles is Chief Justice Lamer's strikingly purple characterization of the
preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 in his decision for the majority
in ProvincialJudges Reference (1997).65 According to Chief Justice
Lamer, the preamble's simple-sounding words form nothing less than
"the grand entrance hall to the castle of the Constitution., 6 6 Through
this entrance hall, the Supreme Court has proceeded to waive a number of principles from Canada's common law constitutional heritage,6 7
along with some home-grown variants, 68 to join the company of previously established standards that Canadian judges may rely upon to
assess the legitimacy of government activity.
A body of academic literature has developed in response to the Supreme Court's affair with common law constitutional principles.6 9
64. In re Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
65. In re Section 18 of the Supreme Court Act, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3.
66. Id. at 77-78.
67. For example, in In re Section 55 of the Supreme Court Act, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721,
the "rule of law" was invoked to retain the force of English-only provincial statutes in
Manitoba to allow time for the government to meet its constitutional obligation to
have statutes translated into French. Id. at 747-49. In In re Section 18 of the Supreme
Court Act, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, the principle of "judicial independence" was invoked to
support the Supreme Court's decision that legislated roll-backs of judicial salaries,
along with those of other public servants, were unconstitutional. Id. at 93.
68. In the In re Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act, 2 S.C.R. at 247-48, the Supreme Court recognized "federalism" and "respect for minorities" as unwritten, organizing principles that are part of the history and construction of Canada's
Constitution in particular.
69. See, e.g., Sujit Choudhry & Robert Howse, ConstitutionalTheory and the Quebec Secession Reference, 13 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 143 (2000); Sujit Choudhry,
Unwritten Constitutionalism in Canada: Where Do Things Stand?, 35 CAN. Bus. L.J.
113 (2001); Mary Dawson, Reflections on the Opinion of the Supreme Courtof Canada
in the Quebec Secession Reference, 11 NAT'L J. CONST. L. 5 (1999); David
Dyzenhaus, Constituting the Rule of Law: FundamentalValues in Administrative Law,
27 QUEEN'S L.J. 445 (2002); David Dyzenhaus, The Deep Structure of Roncarelli v.
Duplessis, 53 U.N.B.L.J. 11 (2004); David Dyzenhaus, The Unwritten Constitution and
the Rule of Law, 23 Sup. CT. L. REV. (Can.) 383 (2004); Robin Elliot, References,
StructuralArgumentation and the OrganizingPrinciples of Canada's Constitution, 80
CAN. B. REV. 67 (2001); Dale Gibson, ConstitutionalVibes: Reflections on the Secession Reference and the Unwritten Constitution, 11 NAT'L J. CONST. L. 49 (2000); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Preamble, Judicial Independence and Judicial Integrity, 11
CONST. FORUM (Can.) 60 (2000); W.H. Hurlburt, Fairy Tales and Living Trees: Observations on Some Recent ConstitutionalDecisions of the Supreme Court of Canada,26
357
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Some of this literature raises critical questions about the appropriateness of judges, presuming to use their Herculean7" powers of judicial
analysis, to go beyond the written sources of constitutional law and
wrest justiciable principles from common law sources based upon little

more than a judicial sense of the "vibes" (vibrations) of the Constitution.7 ' It is a matter of concern that these principles have operated
not only to expand the scope of judges' jurisdiction to review the activity of the executive and legislative branches of government, but also
to serve judges' personal interests.7 2 Another theme of the academic
literature, which is common to both the critics of judicial reliance

upon the common law constitution and those who are more agnostic
about the phenomenon, is the need for judges to provide clearer justification for the unwritten principles that they identify and use to resolve constitutional disputes.73

VI.

THE LURE OF THE COMMON LAW CONSTITUTION

The Supreme Court of Canada's first reliance on the preamble to
the Constitution Act, 1867 to support the invocation of common law
constitutional principles concerned the concept that has come to be
known as the "implied bill of rights." The implied bill of rights is a
collection of principles, including freedom of the press, which are unMAN. L.J. 181 (1999); Jean Leclair, Canada'sUnfathomable Unwritten Constitutional
Principles,27 QUEEN'S L.J. 389 (2002); Roy Millen, The Independence of the Bar: An
Unwritten Constitutional Principle,84 CAN. B. REV. 107 (2005); Walters, supra note
49; Mark D. Walters, 'Common Law, Reason, and Sovereign Will,' 53 U. TORONTO
L.J. 65 (2003) (reviewing T.R.S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE RULE OF LAW (2001)); Mark D. Walters, Incorporating Common Law
into the Constitution of Canada: Egale v. Canada and the Status of Marriage,41 OsGOODE HALL L.J. 75 (2003).
70. Ronald Dworkin posits the figure of the judge Hercules, who is able to develop a fully formed theory of the Constitution that integrates all of its rules and
principles, and which provides the basis for providing the best resolutions to hard
cases. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-30 (1978).

71. Dale Gibson draws a very humorous connection between constitutional adjudication involving the invocation of unwritten principles and a scene from the Australian film The Castle. Gibson, supra note 68, at 49. In the film, an inept lawyer is
arguing against the expropriation of his client's land for use as an airport. Id. The
lawyer's best (but losing) argument against the constitutionality of the expropriation
is that the "vibes" of the matter feel wrong. Id.
72. Jean Leclair, for example, argues in Canada's Unfathomable Unwritten Constitutional Principles:
Decisions in which legislation was impugned on the basis of the unwritten
principle of judicial independence have all had to do with judicial remuneration, and were all initiated by judges. This is more than problematic. The
credibility of the judiciary requires that judges not initiate recourse to the
law, particularly in situations where they are personally and financially interested. This precaution should apply with even greater stringency in cases
where a statute is challenged on the basis of a judicially created principle.
Leclair, supra note 68, at 432-33 (citations omitted).
73. See, e.g., Choudhry & Howse, supra note 68, at 149; Walters, supra note 49, at
94.
1
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derstood to provide the basis for British institutions of government,
and, therefore, the basis of a constitution similar in principle to that of
the United Kingdom. As such, the theory essentially extends Blackstone's indication that "absolute rights.., are coeval with our form of
government. 74 Canadian jurisprudence concerning the implied bill of
rights gives inconclusive authority to the proposition that the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 allows such external principles to
constrain parliamentary and provincial legislative authority.7 5 Indeed,
in the immediate pre-Charter period, a majority of the Supreme Court
76
seemed prepared to reject the implied bill of rights concept entirely.
More recent jurisprudence, however, leaves no doubt that the Supreme Court accepts that the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867
provides the judiciary with the authority to: invoke the unwritten
"rule of law" principle to avoid "a legal vacuum ... with consequent
legal chaos; ' 77 protect parliamentary privileges from attacks by news
media concerns, which relies on the guarantee of freedom of the press
in Section 2(b) of the Charter; 7 declare invalid legislation that con-

74. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *127.
75. The first reliance upon the preamble of the Constitution as authority for unwritten principles was by Justices Duff and Cannon in their separate concurring decisions in In re Three Bills Passed by the Legis. Assemb. of Alberta at the 1937 (Third
Session), [1938] S.C.R. 100, 101. In that case, provincial legislation that restricted
freedom of the press was declared ultra vires. Id. at 100. For Justice Cannon, the
primary basis for the declaration of invalidity was that the provincial legislation infringed upon federal jurisdiction over criminal law. Id. at 144-45. Justice Duff found
that the legislation was ultra vires because it depended on other bills. Id. at 132. As a
secondary basis for their decisions, however, both Justices Cannon and Duff alluded
to the necessary role of a free press in the parliamentary system which is the basis of
the United Kingdom's constitutional system and which, through the preamble to the
Constitution Act, 1867, is Canada's inheritance. Id. at 132-35, 146. This suggested,
therefore, an "implied bill of rights," one article of which (at least) is a more or less
absolute restraint upon the power of any level of government to restrict the freedom
of the press. See id.
76. In his decision for the majority in Attorney Generalfor Canada v. City of Montreal, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 770, 796, Justice Beetz held that none of the freedoms attributed
to the implied bill of rights via the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 was "so
enshrined in the Constitution as to be above the reach of competent legislation."
77. In re Section 55 of the Supreme Court Act, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, 747-49. The
spectre of such chaos resulted from all of the province's English-only statutes being
declared invalid for their failure to meet the English and French requirements of the
Manitoba Act. Id. A unanimous court invoked the "rule of law principle" in order to
give temporary legitimacy to English-only statutes for the minimum time necessary
for those statutes to be translated into French. Id. at 749.
78. Donahoe v. Can. Broad. Corp., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319, 332-34, 350-54, 360-65.
The majority held that the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 provided the provincial legislatures with the privileges enjoyed by the British Parliament. Id. at 348.
These privileges extend to the ability of the Speaker of the provincial assembly to
restrict the use of television cameras by the media, notwithstanding the media concern's argument that the Speaker's ruling infringed the guarantee of "freedom of the
press" under Section 2(b) of the Charter. Id. at 332-34, 364.
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flicts with the principle of judicial independence.7 9 Reference Re. Secession of Quebec also demonstrated the Supreme Court's
determination that unwritten principles, which include, but are not
limited to, federalism, democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule of
law, and respect for minorities, comprise the "internal architecture" of
the Constitution. In extraordinary circumstances, such as the proposed secession of a province, the application of these principles may
give rise to positive obligations on the part of the other branches of
government.8 0
Notwithstanding some recent suggestions that the Supreme Court is
determined to dampen some of the high expectations for expanded
judicial review, which its recognition of the common law constitution
has generated, s ' the Court's twenty year fascination with lex non
79. In In re Section 18 of the Supreme Court Act, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, the principle of
judicial independence bolstered the more direct reference to "an independent and
impartial tribunal" in Section 11(d) of the Charter to prevent provincial legislatures
from unilaterally lowering judicial salaries. See id. Chief Justice Lamer's decision for
the majority emphasizes the importance of the unwritten principle in establishing a
new constitutional standard: the establishment of independent judicial compensation
commissions, mandated to produce regular reports on judicial salaries in their relevant jurisdictions. Id. at 94. Such reports must precede any alteration of judicial salaries by the executive or legislative branches of government. See id. Adjustments to
judicial salaries by the executive or legislative branches of government that are inconsistent with the commission reports are potentially reviewable by the courts, and the
constitutionality of such derivations depends on the court being satisfied that the executive or legislature in question has a "legitimate reason for why it has chosen to
depart from the recommendation of the commission." Id. at 110.
80. In In re Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, the unanimous court identified four organizing principles which, although not specifically mentioned in the text of the Constitution, nonetheless represented important parts of its
internal architecture: "federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law,
and respect for minorit[ies]." Id. at 247-48. Of these four principles, two at leastdemocracy and the rule of law/constitutionalism-are derived from English common
law sources rather than the terms of Canada's constitution in particular. These principles operated in the decision to support the Supreme Court's conclusion that a provincial government wishing to secede from Canada would have to respect the rules of
the Constitution. These rules do not contemplate the possibility of unilateral secession. In the Court's analysis, however, the principles of democracy and federalism in
particular dictate that a "clear repudiation of the existing constitutional order and the
clear expression of the desire to pursue secession by the population of a province
would give rise to a reciprocal obligation on all parties to Confederation to negotiate
constitutional changes to respond to that desire." Id. at 265.
81. In Imperial Tobacco Can. Ltd. v. The Queen, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, the tobacco
companies challenged the constitutionality of British Columbia's legislation that provided the provincial government with a special cause of action against the manufacturers of tobacco products to recover the costs of public medical care for smokers in
British Columbia. Id. at 480-81. Among the innovative aspects of the legislation
were the retroactive liability that it imposed on tobacco products manufacturers, and
special rules of procedure which favoured the government, including a reversal of the
onus of proof as it applies otherwise in tort law. Id. at 482-83. The companies' responsibility for causing illness to smokers by tobacco products would be presumed, a
reversal of the onus of proof in relation to harm caused by tobacco products. Id. at
483.
11
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scripta has left its mark. In the next part of this Article, I argue that,
at the same time the Court was ushering common law standards into
the constitution through the "grand entrance hall" of the preamble to
the Constitution Act, 1867, it was using Section 7 of the Charter as a
side door.
VII.

TURNING FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE INTO A DOOR ONTO THE
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION

Section 7 of the Charter reads:

Everyone has the right to life, liberty[,] and security of the person
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice.8 2
Rather than providing a guarantee that is drafted in absolute terms,
parties, who invoke Section 7 of the Charter to challenge the constitutionality of government activity, must establish not only that the government activity infringed on one of their "threshold" rights to life,
liberty, or security of the person, but also that this infringement is not
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 3 From the
perspective of the challenger, this involves trying to anticipate which
principle of fundamental justice, if any, the government would or
should rely upon to justify a deprivation of a threshold right, and then
convincing the court that the deprivation offends that principle.
Several of the constitutional arguments raised by the companies were based on the
unwritten rule of law principle, which the Supreme Court has recognized and applied
in earlier cases, such as Manitoba Language Rights. Id. at 497-99. The version of the
rule of law concept that the companies encouraged the Supreme Court to accept was
one that is offended by retroactive legal liability and by a lack of generality for legal
liability (the cause of action only applies to tobacco products manufacturers). Id. at
501, 503. The companies also argued that common law constitutional principles that
comprise the rule of law principle guarantee a fair trial process and that this guarantee is infringed by the special procedure that the legislation established for the pursuit
of the cause of action against tobacco products manufacturers. Id. at 504-05.
All of the tobacco companies' submissions were rejected by Justice Major, writing
for a unanimous Court. Id. at 501-05. The Court's reasoning was characterized by
the suggestion that common law constitutional principles cannot be relied upon to
expand the scope of judicial review, when the text of the Constitution is clear about
the rights guarantee in question. Id. at 500-01. In relation to the fair trial argument,
for example, Justice Major held that since the written text of the Constitution specifically provides for a fair trial in the criminal law context under Section 11(d) of the
Canadian Charter, there is no constitutional right to a fair civil trial. Id. at 500.
82. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act,
1982, ch. 11, § 7 (U.K.).
83. See id. This understanding of Section 7 as a sit;gle qualified right is the dominant interpretation. An alternative "two rights" interpretation argues that there is an
unqualified right to "life, liberty[,] and security of the person" which can only be
limited through Section 1 of the Charter (the limitation clause for all Charter guarantees), and a second right "not to be deprived of life, liberty[,] or security of the person
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." Gosselin v. Att'y
11
Gen. of Quebec, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, 614 (Arbour, J., dissenting).
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Section 7 of the Charter enshrines guarantees that are among the

most revered in human rights theory and practice. As such, this Section of the Charter is a distillation of Canada's domestic attempt to
realize the modern liberal project of restraining governments in order
to protect the most fundamental "natural" rights and freedoms of individuals.'l Accordingly, the nature of the principles that allow governments to infringe on these values is as important as any issue in
constitutional law.
In light of the significant role played by the principles of fundamental justice in Canada's constitutional order, it is ironic that the specific

term, fundamental justice, had no firm meaning in Canadian or British
law before the Charter was entrenched in the Constitution in 1982.85

Fundamental justice's closest relative is natural justice. Natural justice is a well established concept in administrative law, which refers to
the rules that define fair procedure. Where fundamental justice ap-

pears in Canadian law before 1982, in Section 2(e) of the Canadian

Bill of Rights,8 6 it is specifically tied to the procedural concerns of a
"fair hearing."87
In Reference Re. B.C. Motor Vehicle Act,88 Justice Lamer recognized that the drafters of Section 7 of the Charter intended it to allow

the courts to engage in only procedural review. Justice Lamer deter-

mined, however, that the drafters' intent was of minimal weight.8 9
Justice Lamer held that, in light of the language used,9 0 the judiciary's
obligation to give the Charter as much scope as possible for the pro-

84. See Carter, supra note 63.
85. See K. Michael Stephens, Fidelity to FundamentalJustice: An Originalist Construction of Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 13 NAT'L J.
CONST. L. (Can.) 183 (2002).
86. Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. II, ch. 44 (U.K.), as reprinted in
R.S.C., § 2(e) (Appendix III 1985).
87. Section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights provides that, unless an act of Parliament expressly declares that it operates notwithstanding the Bill of Rights, laws of
Canada shall be construed not to "deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his
rights and obligations[.]" Id. § 2(e) (emphasis added).
The historical record is somewhat unclear as to why fundamental justice recommended itself over the better-known natural justice term. What seems to have been
the case, however, is that natural justice was rejected because of its close association
with the concept of due process. See Stephens, supra note 85. At the time that the
wording of the Charter was being debated, a palpable concern existed among Canadian parliamentarians and provincial politicians that the American experience of
"substantive due process" review by the Supreme Court of the United States should
be avoided in Canada. Id. at 223. In what has become one of the supreme ironies of
Canadian constitutional history, in this climate of concern, "fundamental justice" was
identified as a principle that would be more narrowly focused upon fair procedure,
even more than "natural justice." Id. at 218.
88. In re Constitutional Question Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 530.
89. Id.
90. It was open to the drafters to use the term "natural justice," but they chose the
362
broader term "fundamental justice." Id.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol13/iss2/4
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V13.I2.3

20

Carter: “Blackstoned” Again: Common Law Liberties, the Canadian Constitut

2007]

BLACKSTONED AGAIN

tection of rights and freedoms, and the structure of the rest of the
legal rights sections of the Charter, 9 1 fundamental justice had to be a
concept that goes beyond procedural review to allow the courts to
critically compare government activity to certain principles of substantive morality. While Justice Lamer indicated that these principles of
fundamental justice could not be given "exhaustive content or simple
enumerative definition, ' 92 the place to look for them is in the legal
system that we already have: "[T]he principles of fundamental justice
are to be found in the basic tenets of [the] legal system."9 3
Justice Lamer's decision for the majority in Reference Re. B.C. Motor Vehicle Act is the event that turned the principles of fundamental
justice under Section 7 of the Charter into a door to the common law
constitution. 94 The basic tenets of our legal system are reflected to a
greater or lesser extent in statute and in common law rules. Primarily,
however, it must be assumed that the most venerable principles of
fundamental justice are unwritten norms with roots in our British legal heritage. An example is provided by the Reference Re. B.C. Motor
Vehicle Act decision itself. The case dealt with the constitutionality of
an absolute liability offence of driving while one's license is suspended. In prosecuting an absolute liability offence, the Crown only
has to prove that the accused performed the prohibited conduct.
Proof of any specific or general intention to commit the conduct is not
part of the Crown's case. The absolute liability offence of driving with
a suspended license allowed for the possibility that a jail sentence
could be imposed upon conviction.
In terms that echo Blackstone's reference to the common law's connection to "time whereof the memory of man runneth not to contrary" Justice Lamer stated:
It has from time immemorial been part of our system of laws that
the innocent not be punished. This principle has long been recognized as an essential element of a system for the administration of
justice which is founded upon a belief in the dignity and worth of
91. Section 7 is the first of the Legal Rights part of the Charter which extends to
Section 14. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act,
1982, ch. 11, §§ 7-14 (U.K.). Section 7 is drafted in general terms which, to some
extent, illustrates the legal rights sections that follow, which are specific in relation to
the protections that they provide for the rights and liberties of people who are subject
to the criminal justice process at various points. See id. Some of the specific legal
rights sections provide protections that are more than procedural. See id. §§ 8-14.
These include, for example, the right to be secure from "unreasonable" search and
seizure under Section 8. Id. §8. Accordingly, if Section 7 illustrates in general terms
the specific protections in the Legal Rights part of the Charter, then it should allow
for more than procedural review of government activity. In re Constitutional Question Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. at 502-03; see id. § 7.
92. In re Constitutional Question Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. at 513.
93. Id. at 503.
94. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
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the human person and on the rule of law. It is so old that its first
enunciation was in Latin actus non facit reun nisi mens sit rea.9 5
Based upon this ancient maxim, the Supreme Court held that the
absolute liability provision of the Motor Vehicles Act offended at least
one of the principles of fundamental justice, which we must assumealthough the Court is not absolutely clear on the point-is that the
Crown must prove a guilty mind before someone can be sent to jail for
performing prohibited conduct. As Professor Hogg argues, "[a]ll that
can be discerned from the opinions is the view that absolute liability is
morally repugnant."9 6
VIII.

LosT

IN THE COMMON LAW

A legacy of Reference Re. B.C. Motor Vehicle Act is a riddle that
requires judges to draw upon all of the oracular abilities that Blackstone attributes to them. If principles of fundamental justice are already and have always been with us, then how are the basic tenets of
our legal system, which are fundamental and deserve constitutional
status, to be distinguished from those lesser norms, which are, at best,
merely foundational 9 7 or even anachronistic? Many of these lesser
norms have historically supported offences that are now vulnerable to
being declared invalid. For example, in relation to the Motor Vehicles
Act decision itself, Professor Hogg points out that absolute liability
offences, such as the one that was declared unconstitutional in the decision, have always been a "familiar (if unloved) part of our legal system." 98 On Blackstone's account, there would be good reason to give
absolute liability offences the benefit of the doubt in relation to their
conformity with the basic tenets of our legal system. Absolute liability
offences have certainly been used "time out of mind," which is a quality that Blackstone identifies as the basis for "the goodness of a custom." Somehow, the principle that supports absolute liability offences
managed to survive into the modern era along with the mens rea principle that was finally its undoing. Nothing in Justice Lamer's reassurance that the principles of fundamental justice are among the basic
tenets of the legal system assists us in understanding why some principles transcend others. We are left to rely on judicial intuition.
Situating fundamental justice among the basic tenets of the legal
system has resulted in some of the most "vibes-oriented"-as Dale
95. Id. at 513.
96. HOGG, supra note 61, § 44.21.
97. See Walters, supra note 49. Walters discusses taxonomy of unwritten constitutional law principles, which include those that are "fundamental" and have the power
to render government activity invalid and lesser norms which are merely "foundational." Id. While providing guidance, foundational norms are subject to the doctrine
of legislative supremacy. Id.
98. HOGG, supra note 61, § 44.2.
364
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Gibson would have it 9 9-or purely intuitive adjudication in Canada's
constitutional jurisprudence. The very nature of the "legal system,"
the tenets of which are supposed to characterize fundamental justice,
have been matters of debate in the Supreme Court. In an attempt to
put some restrictions on the genie of substantive review that Chief
Justice Lamer released in Motor Vehicles Act, Chief Justice Lamer (as
he had become) argued in B. (R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto (1995)100 that the liberty interest in Section 7, and,
therefore, the principles of fundamental justice that may limit it,
should not be extended beyond the criminal law context to include
child protection proceedings. 10 1 The Chief Justice's position in B. (R.)
was difficult to reconcile, however, with his finding that, on the facts
of the New Brunswick Child and Family Services v. G.(J.) (1999)102
case, fundamental justice required the provision of state-funded legal
counsel for a woman whose security of0 3 the person rights were infringed by child apprehension hearings.
The post-Lamer Court continues to wrestle with this issue. While a
beachhead for Section 7 beyond the criminal justice system is now
secure'0 4 in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General) (2002),105 Chief
Justice McLachlin for the majority was not only unprepared to extend
Section 7 protections beyond an "adjudicative context" to include positive rights to welfare benefits, but also unprepared to rule conclusively that an adjudicative context was a prerequisite for the
application of Section 7.1°6 Astonishingly, however, in the subsequent
case of Chaoulli v. Quebec (2005),1°7 Chief Justice McLachlin made no
mention of her earlier reservations in her decision supporting the majority, which held that Section 7 interests were engaged in the entirely
non-judicial context of health care policy decision-making.10 8
99. See Gibson, supra note 69.
100. See Richard B. v. Children's Aid Soc'y of Metro. Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315.
101. Id. at 330.
102. J.G. v. Minister of Health and Cmty. Servs., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46.
103. Id. at 56 (holding that indigent parents have a constitutional right to statefunded counsel when the government is suspending the parents' custody of their
child).
104. As mentioned above, Section 7 rights are engaged by child apprehension hearings, id., and also by administrative proceedings in certain circumstances. See British
Columbia Human Rights Comm'n v. Blencoe, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307, 338 (holding that
Section 7 of the Charter can extend to human rights proceedings).
105. Gosselin v. Att'y Gen. of Quebec, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429.
106. See id. at 490 ("This Court has indicated in its s. 7 decisions that the administration of justice does not refer exclusively to processes operating in the criminal law
.... Rather, our decisions recognize that the administration of justice can be implicated in a variety of circumstances[.] Bastarache J. argues that s. 7 applies only in an
adjudicative context. With respect, I believe that this conclusion may be premature.
An adjudicative context might be sufficient, but we have not yet determined that one
is necessary in order for s. 7 to be implicated.") (citations omitted).
107. Chaoulli v. Att'y Gen. of Quebec, [2005] S.C.R. 791.
108. Id. at 843, 860 (McLachlin, J., concurring).
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With so much uncertainty about which part of the legal system is to
be mined in the search for principles of fundamental justice, it is no
surprise that there has emerged no unified concept of the specific
principles themselves. Again, the Motor Vehicles Act decision provides a prime example. The case seemed to augur a heyday for high
subjectivism" as a principle of fundamental justice drawn from the
common law constitution that applies to criminal law. In retrospect,
however, the constitutional requirement that the Crown prove full intention for criminal offences turned out to be fairly specific to the
murder offence. In R. v. Martineau(1990),l 1° the Supreme Court held
that, in light of the serious consequences of being found guilty of the
murder offence and the negative social attitudes towards those who
are labelled murderers, it is a principle of fundamental justice that the
Crown prove subjective foresight of death on the part of the accused
in order to achieve a murder conviction. 1 In relation to manslaughter, however, which is the most serious criminal offence next to murder, the Supreme Court upheld a significant degree of objective
liability.
Some of Justice McLachlin's reasoning for the majority in R. v.
Creighton (1993),112 which dealt with the offence of unlawful act manslaughter, suggests the extent to which the Court can become adrift in
the uncharted territory of unwritten constitutional principles. The
concept of the "basic tenets of the legal system" provides no real guidance. In this territory, constitutional standards turn on judicial assessments of such intangible concepts as social stigma, leading to
stunning conclusions such as that the most important
feature of the
13
stigma of manslaughter is that it is not murder.'
The Creighton decision contains passages of classic Blackstonian
reasoning in relation to the nature of the rights and liberties that the
common law guarantees. The majority decision suggests, for example,
that a benefit of allowing the common law to characterize the principles of fundamental justice is that we may not have to identify those
principles at all. Time-honoured criminal offences themselves stand
as testament to important underlying principles that we may not discern. As Blackstone asserted, "our law leges non scriptae . . . receive[s] [its] binding power and force of law[ ]"-not to mention its
status as a reflection of underlying constitutional principles-"by long
and immemorial usage, and by their universal reception throughout
the kingdom."' 1 4
109. This term refers to the position that criminal culpability rests on proof of specified mental states.
110. The Queen v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633.
111. Id. at 646.
112. Creighton v. The Queen, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3.
113. See id. at 47.

114. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *64.
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Like Blackstone, Justice McLachlin's decision for the majority encourages us to take it on faith that the older an offence is, the more it
is likely to be consistent with underlying values of our society,
whatever they may be. Furthermore, McLachlin's analysis provides
an astonishing contemporary correlate of Blackstone's admonishment
that "though their reason be not obvious at first view, yet we owe such
a deference to former times as not to suppose that they acted without
consideration." Justice McLachlin states:
We are here concerned with a common law offence virtually as old
as our system of criminal law. It has been applied in innumerable
cases around the world. And it has been honed and refined over
the centuries. Because of its residual nature, it may lack the logical
symmetry of more modern statutory offences, but it has stood the
practical test of time. Could all this be the case, one asks, if the law
violates our fundamental notions1 15
of justice, themselves grounded in
the history of the common law?
In fact, Justice Lamer's admonition to look for the principles of fundamental justice among the basic tenets of our legal system was, from
the beginning, too general to provide direction to the courts in their
important work of identifying unwritten principles that restrict the
legislative and executive branches of government. What it has done,
however, is left the Supreme Court's hands very free to draw upon
time-honoured principles, when those principles seem intuitively correct for application to cases, and to develop novel forms of judicial
review unrestricted by doctrine imposed by other parts of the Constitution. This is a phenomenon that the Author has elsewhere 6characterized as the development of "economies of adjudication.""l ,
After twenty years of applying the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Motor Vehicles Act, fundamental justice has come to include some
venerable principles drawn from the common law, and it has also been
extended to principles that are intended to provide a critical perspective on past legal practices. In the venerable principle category, the
principles of fundamental justice extend to the need for sufficient precision or lack of vagueness in legislation. In discussing the vagueness
doctrine in R. v. Nova Scotia PharmaceuticalSociety (1992),' 17 Justice
Gonthier for the entire Court linked it to the more general unwritten
rule of law principle. 1 ' The Court's indication that the rule of law
requires legal provisions that are precise enough to provide fair notice
to citizens and limit the discretion of government officials is in keeping with pre-Charter authority drawing on the unwritten constitution,
such as Roncarelli v. Duplessis (1959)119 and the Diceyan theory that
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Creighton, 3 S.C.R. at 45.
See Carter, supra note 63, at 243.
Nova Scotia Pharm. Soc'y v. The Queen, [1992] S.C.R. 606.
See id. at 626-27.
Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121.
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was cited with approval in that case. 120 The constitutional standard of
precision established in Nova Scotia Pharmaceuticals, however,
emerges as little more than a framework for subjective judicial intuition: [L]egal provisions must "provide an adequate basis for legal
debate. 1 2 1
As compared to the venerable principles drawn from our rule of law
tradition that support the vagueness doctrine, the Supreme Court has
also indicated that the principles of fundamental justice include other
Charter rights. Justice Lamer's indication in Motor Vehicles Act that
fundamental justice in Section 7 is a general statement of the more
specific guarantees contained in the rest of the Legal Rights part of
the Charter, which protect the interests of people being investigated,
charged, and prosecuted for criminal offences, was reaffirmed in R. v.
Mills (1999). 122 In Mills, the Court also emphasized that the principles
of fundamental justice protect the interests of people who are victims
of criminal activity and whose Charter rights are protected by criminal
laws that may be the subject of challenges by people accused of offences. In this regard, the Mills decision contributed to the confusion
that entered fundamental justice analysis with the Supreme Court's
decision in Rodriguez v. British Columbia. 2 3 In Rodriguez, Justice
Sopinka's decision for the majority held that fundamental justice is
not exclusively concerned with principles that serve the interests of
people who are using Section 7 to challenge the constitutionality of
laws.12 4 Fundamental justice can include societal interests that are
served by the existence of the law.125
IX.

THE MALMO-LEVINE FRAMEWORK FOR PRINCIPLES OF
FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE

In the course of allowing the concept of fundamental justice to become a vehicle for giving constitutional status to common law principles, the Supreme Court has ventured into territory that is
unmanageably broad. The legal system writ large is devoid of clear
markers that indicate which of its tenets are of the fundamental variety that represent restrictions on the legislative and executive
branches of government and which of these tenets are merely foundational in nature. Furthermore, at the same moment that fundamental
justice was turned into a depository for common law principles, it was
also identified as a home for other Charter principles that are sup120. Id. at 844 (Abbott, J., concurring).
121. Nova Scotia Pharm. Soc'y, [1992] S.C.R. at 639.
122. L.C. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, 714.
123. Rodriguez v. Att'y Gen. of Can., [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519.
124. See id. at 608.
125. In Rodriguez, although the offence of assisting suicide infringed the security of
the rights of people to end their own lives, the offence served society's interest in
recognizing the sanctity of life. Id. at 595.
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posed to be tools for the critical analysis of long-standing legal principles and practices. In R. v. Malmo-Levine,'26 the Supreme Court of
Canada provided something of a restatement of the framework that it
would employ for identifying principles of fundamental justice. In the
result, the Court reasserted its Blackstone style of commitment to the
law that we already have and its ability to reflect the underlying principles of the Constitution.
In Malmo-Levine, a majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court
of Canada upheld the offences of simple possession of marijuana and
possession for the purposes of trafficking under the Narcotics Control
Act. 27 The introduction to this Article mentioned the reference in
the majority decision written by Justices Gonthier and Binnie to the
lack of a "free-standing constitutional right to smoke 'pot."" 2 8 The
majority's observation in this regard was a response to Malmo-Levine's unsuccessful "pleasure principle" argument. Malmo-Levine
contended that the right to liberty under Section 7 of the Charter is
infringed by government activity that limits personal autonomy in a
manner that is short of actual imprisonment. 1 29 The Court rejected
Malmo-Levine's argument in terms, which, if not intended to be derisive, are nonetheless entertaining. Justices Gonthier and Binnie state:
While we accept Malmo-Levine's statement that smoking marihuana is central to his lifestyle, the Constitution cannot be stretched
to afford protection to whatever activity an individual chooses to
define as central to his or her lifestyle. One individual chooses to
smoke marihuana; another has an obsessive interest in golf; a third
is addicted to gambling. The appellant Caine invokes a taste for
fatty foods. A society that extended constitutional
protection to any
1 30
and all such lifestyles would be ungovernable.
Malmo-Levine and Caine were, however, successful in passing the
threshold test for Section 7 of the Charter on the basis of another
argument. The simple possession of a narcotic offence allows for
prison terms. As established in Reference Re. B.C. Motor Vehicle Act,
potential prison terms automatically infringe the liberty interests of
accused persons. Malmo-Levine and Caine argued that this infringement of a threshold Section 7 right was not in accordance with what
they proffered as a principle that should be recognized among the
complement of those that comprise the notion of fundamental justice:
J.S. Mill's harm principle. The harm principle holds that government
limitations on individual liberty
are only justified to prevent people
3
from causing harm to others.1 1
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Malmo-Levine v. The Queen, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, 633-34.
Id. at 589-90.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 623-24.
See id. at 631.
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In responding to Malmo-Levine's harm principle argument, Justices
Gonthier and Binnie returned to Justice Lamer's classic Blackstonian
indication in Reference Re. B. C. Motor Vehicle Act that "the principles
of fundamental justice lie in 'the basic tenets of our legal system.
They do not lie in the realm of general public policy but in the inher' 1 32
ent domain of the judiciary as guardian of the justice system."
From the entire set of common law principles, however, the Court
narrowed the focus of its search for fundamental justice principles by
relying on Justice Sopinka's analysis in Rodriguez, where he indicated
that "mere common law rules" do not qualify. 133 The common law
standards that the Court will accept as components of fundamental
justice are ones "upon which there is some consensus that they are
vital or fundamental to our societal notion of justice." Also, the common law standards that warrant recognition as principles of fundamental justice must not be "so broad as to be no more than vague
generalizations about what our society considers to be ethical or
moral. They must be capable of being identified with some precision
and applied to situations in a manner which yields an understandable
result." Finally, the principles must be "legal principles."13' 4
Justices Gonthier and Binnie held that the harm principle met none
of the three criteria for a principle of fundamental justice. Beginning
with the "legal principle" requirement, the majority found that the
harm principle "is better characterized as a description of an important state interest rather than a normative 'legal' principle."1 3' 5 Even
accepting that the harm principle might be a legal standard, however,
the majority held that there is no societal consensus that the state can
criminalize only harmful conduct. Justices Gonthier and Binnie
stated: "No doubt ... the presence of harm to others may justify legislative action under the criminal law power. However, we do not think
that the absence of proven harm creates the unqualified barrier to legislative action that the appellants suggest., 136 Furthermore, the majority was not convinced that the use of narcotics is, in fact, harmless
in a relevant sense. Smoking any substance, including marijuana, is
detrimental to health and, as it pertains to the famous anti-paternalism of Mill's theory, Justices Gonthier and Binnie did "not accept the
proposition that there is a general prohibition against the criminalization of harm to self."13' 7 Furthermore, citing a recent Law Commission of Canada policy paper, their Lordships emphasized that self132. Id. at 633.
133. Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. British Columbia, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519).
134. Id. at 634 (quoting Rodriguez v. British Columbia, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519) (emphasis omitted).
135. Id. at 634.
136. Id. at 635.
137. Id. at 638. Justices Gonthier and Binnie continue: "Canada continues to have
paternalistic laws. Requirements that people wear seatbelts and motorcycle helmets
are designed to 'save people from themselves.' There is no consensus that this sort3*W)
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destructive
behaviour can result in costs that society at large has to
1 38
bear.
The majority also found the harm principle wanting in relation to
the requirement that principles of fundamental justice be precise
enough to be applicable and to produce understandable results. Here
Justices Gonthier and Binnie drew upon the long-standing debate in
relation to the nature of "harm" in Mill's theory. Their Lordships argued that the unmanageability of the harm principle is established by
the fact that:
Even those who agree with the "harm principle" as a regulator of
the criminal law frequently disagree about what it means and what
offences will meet or offend the harm principle. In the absence of
any agreed definition of "harm" for this purpose, allegations and
counter-allegations of non-trivial harm can
be marshalled on every
139
side of virtually every criminal law issue.
For the purposes of this discussion, the majority's analysis of the
''societal consensus" requirement for the harm principle as a potential
principle of fundamental justice is particularly significant. The majority's decision evinces strong elements of the Blackstonian approach to
the analysis of rights and liberties based upon the assumption that
these values are reflected in the phenomena of existing rules. Precisely what these guarantees are is a matter of probability only, although based upon the legal rules we may be able to conclusively
exclude some candidates for constitutional status. This is the inductive "from the ground up" process of analysis that contrasts with the
critical "top down" natural law tradition, which explains the existence
and situation of bills of rights such as Canada's Charter entrenched
within Canada's written constitution.
In considering the extent to which there may be "societal consensus" in relation to the harm principle being part of Canadians' concept
of justice, Justices Gonthier and Binnie pointed to the fact that a number of Canada's criminal offences do not involve activity that is clearly
harmful to anyone but the person performing the conduct. Their
Lordships stated:
Several instances of crimes that do not cause harm to others are
found in the Criminal Code. Cannibalism is an offence that does
not harm another sentient being, but that is nevertheless prohibited
on the basis of fundamental social and ethical considerations. Bestiality and cruelty to animals are examples of crimes that rest on their
legislation offends our societal notions of justice. Whether a jail sentence is an appropriate penalty for such an offence is another question." Id.
138. Id. at 638 ("[The Report] notes that 'in a society that recognizes the interdependency of its citizens, such as universally contributing to healthcare or educational
needs, harm to oneself is often borne collectively[.]"').
139. Id. at 639.
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offensiveness to ' deeply
held social values rather than on Mill's
140
"harm principle."
The Supreme Court's method in Malmo-Levine of pointing to the
existing framework of the law to support an argument about the underlying nature of constitutional human rights guarantees echoes Justice McLachlin's analysis in R. v. Creighton discussed above.14 1 In
Creighton, Justice McLachin contended that constitutionality is somehow related to an offence's status as one that is "virtually as old as our
system of criminal law." Justice McLachlin's perspective precisely
echoed Blackstone's insistence on the significance of the "immemorial
usage" of common law rules for our understanding of their binding
authority. Similarly, in Malmo-Levine, Justices Gonthier and Binnie
engage in a kind of res ipsa loquitur reasoning. The existence of a
number of time-tested "harmless" or "victimless" offences in the
Criminal Code is evidence that whatever the principles of fundamental justice may be, they cannot include values such as the "harm principle" that are inconsistent with these offences.
In the critical "top down" tradition of rights analysis, no sliding
scale exists whereby the greater the age that a legal rule has achieved,
the more it receives the benefit of the doubt in relation to its conformity with constitutional principles. Rather than implying that the legal
rule must reflect a beneficial principle, from a critical perspective, the
longevity of a legal rule begs only questions about the extent of oppression that the law may have been responsible for over the course of
its life. The raison d'itre of a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights
is undermined by the suggestion that it draws its content from the
regular legal rules over which it is supposed to provide scrutiny. From
the critical perspective, the ideal situation is one in which the regular
legal rules conform with constitutionally guaranteed rights and142 freedoms, but this relationship is incidental rather than necessary.
The Malmo-Levine framework does not rescue Charter Section 7
jurisprudence from the "chaos of [the] previous attempts to define
140. Id. at 635 (citations omitted).
141. Supra text accompanying note 112.
142. Among the issues that are at large here is the "is/ought" distinction that is well
known to legal theory. The legal positivist perspective argues that there is no necessary connection between the way the law is and the way it ought to be. A rule's status
as "law" is not dependent upon its moral content. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) (explaining the ideas of "law, coercion, and morality as different but related social phenomena"). This article concerns competing natural law
perspectives, both of which argue that there is some necessary moral content to rules
that have the status of law. The Blackstone perspective argues that most rules with
their roots in the common law have this content, although we may not be able to
define precisely the underlying moral principle. The critical perspective descends from
a more certain understanding of the moral principle and is able to accept that common law rules may not have the necessary content and, in the context of strong judicial review, judges should declare that these rules are "not law" for the purposes of
our legal system.
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fundamental justice."1'43 The three requirements for principles of fundamental justice continue to reflect a desire to defer to the law that
already exists when giving content to a constitutional provision that is
supposed to be used to critique that body of laws, all of which raises
questions about the basic role of the Charter. The retrograde potential of marrying the content of this important Charter section to our
legal past was manifest in the next case in which the Supreme Court
applied the Malmo-Levine framework, Foundation for Children,
Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General).
X.

FOUNDATION FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH AND THE LAW v.
CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL)

It may be unfortunate that Canada's Constitution does not protect
people's ability to consume the recreational intoxicants of their
choice, but the suggestion that Section 7 of the Charter is not offended
by laws that permit violence against children is a real tragedy for the
status of the Charter as a meaningful human rights instrument. Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General)'44 involved a constitutional challenge of Canada's corporal
punishment defence which allows children to be subjected to "force
by way of correction ...

if the force does not exceed what is reasona-

ble under the circumstances.' 145 The Foundation, a non-profit children's advocacy group, argued that the corporal punishment defence
infringed a number of children's rights under the Charter including
Section 7. A disconcerting, but characteristic aspect of Section 7 analysis was strongly illustrated in the Foundation decision, insofar as it
was accepted by all sides that corporal punishment infringes the security of the person rights of children. Because Section 7 is a qualified
right, however, this gruesome concession only begs the question as to
whether infringement is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Unfortunately, the Court held that corporal punishment of children accords with the principles of fundamental justice or,
at least, it does not offend any of the principles that the Foundation
identified.
The Foundation's Section 7 argument had three parts. The Foundation argued that the corporal punishment defence does not afford children the extent of procedural protections that the principles of
fundamental justice require. The Foundation also argued that the de143. This is Peter Hogg's characterization of the pre-Malmo-Levine case law on the
nature of the principles of fundamental justice. HOGG, supra note 61, at § 44-22.2.
144. See Leclair, supra note 69. See also Mark Carter, The ConstitutionalValidity of
the Corporal Punishment Defence in Canada: A CriticalAnalysis of Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law Versus Canada (Attorney General), 12 INT'L
REV. VICTIMOLOGY 189 (2005) (providing a fuller analysis of the constitutional argu-

ments in the Foundation decision).
145. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46, § 43 (1985).
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fence is unconstitutionally vague. Finally, the Foundation argued that
the corporal punishment defence offends the best interests of the child
principle, and that this principle should be recognized as a principle of
fundamental justice. The majority decision written by Chief Justice
McLachlin rejected all of the Foundation's arguments, including all
three of the Section 7 arguments. The majority decision's analysis of
the best interests of the child principle is most significant for this Article because it illustrates the attempt to have a new principle of fundamental justice recognized. The Court rejected the best interests of the
child principle as a principle of fundamental justice after subjecting
this principle to what was then the newly-minted Malmo-Levine
framework.
Chief Justice McLachlin accepted that the best interests of the child
is a legal principle and, therefore, it satisfies the first Malmo-Levine
criterion. 146 Remarkably, however, the Chief Justice held that the
best interests of the child is not "vital or fundamental to our societal
notion of justice. ' 147 The majority decision also held that the best interests of the child is not "capable of being identified with [sufficient]
precision" so as to satisfy the third Malmo-Levine criterion. 148 In the
Chief Justice's estimation, the application of the principle "is inevitably highly contextual and subject to dispute; reasonable people may
well disagree about the result that its application will yield, particularly in areas of the law where it is1 one
consideration among many,
49
such as the criminal justice system.
Chief Justice McLachlin's analysis of the status of the best interests
of the child principle is mired in Blackstonian considerations that undermine the liberating potential of the Charter in general, and Section
7 in particular. If the Canadian legal system is the exclusive source of
the principles that justify state limitations of our lives, liberty, or the
security of our persons, then Section 7 becomes a vehicle for slavish
deference to the fact that, and the manner in which, these threshold
rights have been limited in the past. In the Foundation case, the Chief
Justice invoked the kind of conservative reasoning that she used in her
decision in Creighton and which Justices Gonthier and Binnie employed in Malmo-Levine. The very existence of rights-infringing laws
over time is evidence that those laws accord with principles of fundamental justice. This conviction, in turn, undermines the candidacy of a
newly proposed principle of fundamental justice, such as the best interests of the child. Despite the tautological character of the argument, we must conclude that the best interests of the child cannot be a
principle of fundamental justice because it is inconsistent with the
146. Canadian Found. for Children, Youth & the Law v. Att'y Gen. in Right of
Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, 92-93.
147. Id. at 94.
148. Id. at 95 (quoting Rodriguez v. British Columbia, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, 591).
149. Id.
17A
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rights-infringing corporal punishment defence that has survived for so
long in our legal system.
The Foundationcase demonstrates that this archaic form of faith in
the evolutionary emergence of natural rights within the "living" law
becomes dangerous when the faith operates to deny constitutional status to principles that would safe-guard the most vulnerable people in
our society. The Foundation decision provides another illustration of
how Blackstonian faith in the existence in the common law of unarticulated standards of social order clashes with the critical, rationalist
tradition of extra-legal natural rights, which spawned the modern
human rights project and which explains the perceived need for constitutionally entrenched bills of rights.15 ° As I have emphasized earlier in this Article, a bill of rights cannot provide critical perspective
on the normative content of ordinary statute and common law if the
source of the Charter's meaning is to be found in that ordinary law.
In applying this conservative methodology to the Foundation's arguments, the Chief Justice pointed to the existence of laws that are
inconsistent with the best interests of the child principle. These laws
are used to support Chief Justice McLachlin's determination that, although the best interests of the child principle "is an important factor
for consideration in many contexts," it is not "vital or fundamental to
our societal notion of justice."'' Presumably, we are to conclude that
if the best interests of the child principle was vital in this sense, then
such laws and practices would not exist. Chief Justice McLachlin
states:
[T]he "best interests of the child" may be subordinated to other
concerns in appropriate context. For example, a person convicted
of a crime may be sentenced to prison even where it may not be in
his or her child's best interests. Society does not always deem it
essential that the "best interests of the
child" trump all other con1 52
cerns in the administration of justice.
Quite apart from the extent to which the majority's conservative
methodology undermines the Charter's ability to provide critical progressive perspective on our laws, the Chief Justice's suggestion that
the best interests of the child principle was wanting because it failed to
"trump all other concerns in the administration of justice" is remarkable. The majority's decision in the Foundation case holds a principle
that is concerned with the most vulnerable people in our society to a
standard that her own favoured examples of principles of fundamental
justice fail to meet. These examples are the need for a guilty mind and
the need for reasonably clear laws.15 3 In relation to the guilty mind
150. This tension between theories of rights is discussed in Mark Carter, Reconsidering the Charter and Electoral Boundaries, 22 DALHOUSIE L.J. 53, 71-76 (1999).
151. Canadian Found. for Children, Youth & the Law, 1 S.C.R. at 94.
152. Id. at 94-95.
153. Id. at 93.
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example, Canadian criminal law contains a number of objective liabil-

ity offences.' 54 The discussion above in relation to the doctrine of
vagueness also highlighted the malleability of the concept of "reasonably clear laws." In fact, the principles of fundamental justice must be

expected to include values that do not "trump" but are in a necessary
and on-going tension with any number of competing dictates of justice. This is a standard aspect of rights theory 5' and juristic
practice.15 6
XI.

CONCLUSION

William Blackstone's ghost haunts the Supreme Court of Canada's
decisions that have developed the concept of fundamental justice in

Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. From its
earliest decision on point, the Supreme Court has held that a defining
characteristic of this amorphous complement of standards is that they
are part of the "basic tenets of our legal system." These basic tenets
will be comprised largely of unwritten common law concepts, and the
evidence for their existence will be many of the laws that we have

always had. Conversely, long-standing legal practices will serve as evidence of the absence in our Constitution of any principles that are
inconsistent with such practices. Section 7 of the Charter is too important to the human rights project in Canada to require a necessary relationship between the reference to "fundamental justice" in that
section and the law that we have always had. As demonstrated by the
role that it played in such monumental events as the end of slavery,

the best of what can be found in the common law may correspond
with human rights principles. However, decisions such as Foundation
for Youth and Children demonstrate that our respect for the common
law has to be tempered by an understanding that the common law is
not a reliable or exclusive source of human rights principles.
154. The majority in Creighton v. The Queen, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3, 33, upheld the
objective liability aspect of the offence of unlawful act manslaughter. There is also an
objective test for the element of assault offences which qualify them as more serious
sexual assault offences. See Mark Carter, The Corrective Force Defence (Section 43)
and Sexual Assault, 6 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 35 (2001).

155. Ronald Dworkin identifies "weight" as a defining characteristic of principles,
arguing that when they intersect "one who must resolve the conflict has to take into
account the relative weight of each." DWORKIN, supra note 70, at 26. This dimension
of weight is to be distinguished from the way in which certain principles or individual
rights arguments trump policies or utilitarian goals.
156. In L.C. v. Mills, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 668, the majority discusses a situation where
several principles of fundamental justice were engaged in the same case: full answer
and defence, privacy, and equality. Id. at 688. The Justices' comments make it clear
that no one of the principles is expected to trump all other concerns in the administration of justice. Id. at 713. Justices McLachlin and Iacobucci state: "At play in this
appeal are three principles, which find their support in specific provisions of the Charter. These are full answer and defence, privacy, and equality. No single principle is
absolute and capable of trumping the others; all must be defined in light of competing
claims." Id. (emphasis added).
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